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:cThe New Apologetic
N its next three issues the Forum will present a
number of critical discussions of the new apologetic at Westminster Seminary, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, two of them appearing in the
. present number. Most of them have been written
le, by men of thel:Reforme&faith whose graduate train. iJ;lg h.as been primarily in the field of philosophy. Ac~ordingly, their discussion will concern primarily
l:ie theory of knowledge and they will be occupied
rith questions such as these. Can the unbeliever
now truth? May we legitimately speak of "brute
cts," or must we begin with "facts-to-a-mind"?
~es knowledge add something to facts otherwise
H1eaningless? Do God's thoughts enter into the
being of facts, and if they do, how avoid identifying
God with His creation? Can we really know any one
thing truly without knowing everything else? Can
we say that the universe is logical in the same sense
in which a deductive system of propositions is logical? Could the believer and the unbeliever carry on
anything like a significant conversation without at
least a minimum of common meanings and common
•presuppositions? These and other questions are ex1 pertly handled in the forthcoming articles.
Which,
naturally, is not to say that they are finally settled.

of the antithesis a content which can only lead to
exaggerated, improbable, and even absurd results.

I

Again, none of the present writers suspects the
proponents of the new apologetic of making anything like a subtle attempt to undermine Christian
doctrine. But when theories and presuppositions
which can lead only to pantheism are uncritically
taken over in order to arrive at theism, the resulting discourse easily reduces to the cabalistic. And,
after all, a bad argument for the truth frequently
does more damage than a good argument against it,
The aim of the present editorial is not to give a digest of the articles hereby introduced but, rather, to
provide a certain amount of background for the better appreciation of them.
I

In asserting that the givens with which we must
begin are not facts but "God-interpreted facts," the
new apologetic seems to have taken over uncritically
the idealist theory of knowledge and truth, a theory
leading logically to a kind of pantheism. For the assertion appears to mean that "to be" is identical with·
"to be interpreted by God." In other words, God's
interpretative action enters into the being 9f . a fact
(say, a tree, a bar of iron, or a human thought) in
such a way as to make its existence identical with
God's knowledge. Now if God's knowledge constitutes the facts, the facts must constitute God's
knowledge. How, then, can we distinguish God's
knowledge from God's creatures?

The present critics of the new apologetic have no
quarrel with its Christian theistic position, nor do
they question the legitimacy of the attempt to demonstrate the reasonableness of the Christian faith by
borrowing from secular philosophers. They seriously question, however, the adequacy and, in fact, the
This is the question of the relation between truth
technical correctness with which the new apologetic
has done its job. Specifically, they complain (1) and reality, a question which the idealist handles
that its theory of knowledge, borrowed from the somewhat as follows. Truth and reality, so he argues,
idealist school, logically leads to a species of panthe- must have a fundamental identity, since if truth is
ism, not to theism; (2) that it frequently confuses not identical with reality there must be something
an argument by presupposition with a rational dem- in reality which is not a content of truth and which,
onstration; (3) that it sometimes grossly misrepre- therefore, cannot be a possible object of thoughtsents the position of secular and Catholic thinkers any thought. But if truth is to be truth, it must con(It is one thing to reject Aristotle; it is quite another tain all of reality in ideal form. Yet that is demonstrably impossible since truth can never, for exto play up the superiority of the Christian position
ample, include whatever we feel at the moment, nor
by contrasting it with a distortion of Aristotle);
. can it include the s~&,sible r + and the sensible
( 4) that it ignores and also confuses recognized future. Truth and reality, therefore, do not seem to
meanings of the words "truth" and "knowledge"; be identical after all. Nevertheless, if in knowledge
5) that it arbitrarily assigns new and unheard of we must begin with "facts pre-interpreted," they
meanings to certain technical terms in philosophy, must be identical. Now there is but one way out of
thereby confusing issues, raising pseudo-problems, this dilemma and that is to regard truth as an aspect
and presenting pseudo-demonstrations of foregone of reality. Accordingly, reality must be conceived
conclusions; and (6) that it tends to put into the idea as an all-comprehending Absolute, something behind
THE CALVIN FORUM

* * * AUGUST - SEPTEMBER, 1953

3

and beyond the distinction of subject and object, i.e.,
the knower and the thing known.
Now if, on the one hand, we identify this Absolute
with God, we arrive at a full-blown pantheism-God
is the one Reality comprehending all other realities
which, in turn, are so many parts or aspects of God.
In fact, we could say that God is the one Reality comprehending all illusions, since whatever is not itself
the Absolute is not ultimately real. And, on the other hand, if we do not identify God with the Absolute,
God must be regarded as something less than the
Absolute, i.e., a part or aspect of the Absolute and
having, therefore, no final reality in Himself. Well,
any theory of knowledge the logic of which pushes
one into something like that can hardly be considered a happy choice if one wishes to make a case for
Christian theism.
II
The new apologetic maintains that the unbeliever,
in rejecting supernatural revelation, rejects the
"first premise" of all true reasoning and cannot,
therefore, hope to come to a true conclusion. He
may be as logical in his argumentation as he pleases,
but since he is simply out of touch with reality, his
reasoning cannot but end in sheer illusion. Therefore, he cannot really be said to "know anything
truly." 1 In short, unless I "know God truly," I cannot know anything truly.
.The .trouble ~th a statement of this sort is that it
involves enough truth and also enough ambiguity to
function as the source of endless futile discussion.
The statement involves-or, at least, is associated
with-the truth that inasmuch as only God can be
said to know everything, so that only He can have
the true point of view, therefore God knows truth
absolutely. In this sense of knowing, obviously, no
finite mind, Christian or unbeliever, can be said to
know truth. On the other hand, when I say that in
order to come to a true conclusion, I must fi:rst know
God truly, I hardly mean that I must first know
everything God knows. Apparently, therefore, we
should distinguish between knowing absolutely (as
only God knows) and knowing truly (as, supposedly,
only the Christian knows). Just how, then, can I
show that the Christian knows partially and yet truly
whereas the unbeliever knows partially and yet
falsely? Unfortunately, the new apologetic fails to
give a satisfactory answer to that question.
The position of the new apologetic finds its analogue in idealism, which teaches that true knowledge of any given fact involves knowledge of the
whole universe, a teaching logically following from
its theory that one cannot properly speak of objects,
since they are but abstractions, but that one must
always speak of "objects-to-a- mind" or "objects-tothought." Tennyson's "flower in the crannied wall"
is a reflection in literature of this point of view. In
order to know this flower in its final reality, one
v For purposes of this discussion we can afford to ignore
. the. tautology involved in this expression.
4

would presumably have to know all the
c
its existence, which in the end would involve know
edge of everything. Or, again, in order to give
complete explanatory account of how one billia~
ball causes another to move precisely as it does, o:r:
would have to give an explanatory account of frii
tion, which would involve an account of gravitatioi
which in turn would involve the theory of relativitl
and which, finally, would involve an account of t}j
entire physical universe. Accordingly, the ideali:
argues that inasmuch as every object-to-mind ol
tains its meaning by virtue of its relations to othE
objects-to-mind, we cannot claim real knowledge c
any particular object-to-mind until we know ho1
it is related to all objects-to-mind. This means th~
in the final analysis we can legitimately speak of b~
one real object-to-mind, namely, the universe as
whole (variously designated as the Absolute, th
Real, the Whole, and so on). Implied in all this is th
doctrine that the universe as an object-to-mind so dE
termines any and every particular object-to-mir1
comprehended within it that in and of themselw
they reduce to abstractions, appearances, illusiorl
Thus the carpenter, the scientist, and the commO
man in considering, say, the uses of a block of wdoi
or a bar of iron, are not really dealing with realiti~
at all but only with abstractions. They do not reall;
know these things because they do not relate ther
to the universe as a whole .
Now this view of "knowing truly" represents on
of those theoretical possibilities which no olle wo11li
think of acting upon; in fact, only the idealists aq
cept it in theory, and nobody believes it in practid
Naturally, if in order to know one thing truly wi
must know everything, then if we don't know ever~
thing, we don't know anything. Fortunately, Wj
can admit the truth of this and forget it. Obvious!~
both in ordinary discourse and in science one do~i
not have to possess full information about· tp.is o\
that in order to know that the information one doe!
have is not completely false. If I represent half thj
truth for what it is, namely, half the truth, niy rep)
resentation is evidently true; and it becomes fal~j
only if I represent it as more than that. I do. not, f()l
example, have to know everything Einstein knovy!
about the theory of relativity in order to assert tr:µl~
that Newton's theory is only an approximation; anc
my assertion that the sun is shining does not. becomi
truer when Einstein agrees with it. Of course, morj
people may be inclined to believe the assertion whel'
he makes it, but that is something else again.
·

III
Applying this peculiar theory of krtowledge tp th~
field of religion, the new apologetic argues that th~
unbeliever cannot "know truly" because he rejeqtj
the Christian view of God as the "first premise'' ·ii
his thinking. And again, as in the case of •·th~
idealist's definition of true knowledge, we can aC,
cept this proposition and also pay no further atten;
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tion to it, since it presupposes a very special and not
very useful definition of true knowledge. That is
not to deny that God is the source, the ultimate
ground of all that exists; it is simply to assert that
one can have true knowledge of phenomena in the
sense of accurate description without including God
in the description. Thus I can know, and "know
truly,'' that it is impossible and why it is impossible
under ordinary conditions to start a fire under water
by means of an ordinary match without knowing that
God has willed it so and without knowing all there
is to be known about chemistry. The Christian, in
common with the non-Christian, tests the truth of
his assertions about particular things by an appeal
to laws, secondary causes, particular characters and
qualities as God has determined them. And in doing this he makes neither God nor himself the immediate referent; that is to say, he does not assert
tha( he knows truly that the sun is shining because
he believes that God knows it is shining; nor does
he say that he knows it is shining because he himself
thinks it is shining.
Incidentally, this practice of ignoring the actuality
of secondary causes involves the danger of what has
been called a "suffocating supernaturalism,'' a habit
of mind in which everything is referred to God in
such a way as virtually to identify both natural
events and human actions with God's action. In the
end we arrive at a kind of dead-end theology consisting of the lone proposition that God does everything and that He acts about as He acts. No one
denies this, but its assertion is not particularly useful; like the idealist's assertion that the universe is
One, it amounts to a truism which cancels out no
matter what else we may say about God and the uni. The fact remains that if, for example, I am
be justified by faith, it is I who must exercise
faith; God does not do this for me. Of course, I
need God's grace in order to believe, but it is I and
not God who does the believing-or the doubting,
the repenting, pnd the suffering.

that, of course, the truth of God will always seem
silly to the unregenerate, for the answer to that one
is this: An apologetic which results in conclusions
going counter to what everybody knows to be everyday fact may constitute a lofty exhibition of the gift
of speaking in unknown tongues, but it is not apologetics. Apologetics presumably has for one of its
purposes that of showing the uninitiates that what
the initiates believe is not exactly drivel.

* * *
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This, incidentally, brings to mind the aforesaid
complaint regarding the rather arbitrary use of
terms found in the new apologetic. The apologist
who borrows from the field of philosophy will do
well to keep to the meanings which the history of
philosophy has assigned to certain terms, since
otherwise he will either be misunderstood or accused
of equivocating. 2 And it is no answer to say that in
philosophy the Christian and the non-Christian cannot even approximate identical meanings whenever
they use identical terms. For if that is indeed the \
case there can be but one conclusion, and that is that
apologetics is something wholly futile. 3 Once again,
apologetics is supposed to be, at least in part, for the
refutation of unbelievers, not for their confusion.
To define "five" as "eight,'' and "eight" as "ten,''
and then to argue that five plus eight equals eighteen
may to the layman smell of deep thought and the
higher mathematics, but it is not very fruitful philosophizing, to say nothing of effective apologetics.
Anybody can win a match to his own satisfaction by
making his own rules as he goes along, but that has
nothing to do with useful controversy.

IV

The new apologetic tends to talk about God as
though He were the ultimate presupposition or the
major premise of a deductive system. The idealist,
we may recall, believes that one cannot really know
ahy particular thing truly unless one knows just
about everything else, i.e., unless one knows the
universe as an object-to-mind. As a result, he tends
In other words, if a human being, believer or un- to talk about the universe as though, like geometry,
believer, wishes to gain true knowledge of a tree or it were a deductive system of propositions of which
a bar of iron in terms of secondary causes, he must the universe itself as an object-to-mind constitutes
submit his thinking to the objective existence of the one and only presupposition or first premise.
these things and their qualities as God has estab- Now if the idealist wishes to think reality after the
lished them. Now by the grace of God the believer analogy of a deductive system of propositions, that
may see the glory of the Lord in these things-and is, after all, his privilege. Much more fantastic anathe unbeliever is doubtless the poorer for not seeing logies have been used in the history of philosophy
it-but that does not transform the believer into an as guides to an understanding of ultimate reality.
expert botanist or physicist. Conversion did not make But when, as in the case of the new apologetic, one
a Euclid out of the Philippian jailor. And any sys- tries to make a case for the Christian religion by
tem of apologetics the presuppositions of which in- reducing the relation between God and the created
yqlve the denial of such obvious facts, whatever its universe t2~iLJ?..!!~,!?gica~ one evidently renierit in other respects, will not impress an honest! duces the Deity to a part of a system of which creaand intelligent unbeliever. One supposes, however,\ tion is also a part. And that, clearly, is not Christian
that apologetics is not only for the edification of the
2l Unless he has sound reasons for believing that his writings
saints but also for the refutation of normally reason- will be a must for undergraduates for the next five centuries
or so.
able and educated sinners. Nor will it do to answer 3) Dr. Abraham Kuiper believed that it was.
THE CALVIN FORUM
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theism. Again, no one is accusing anybody in Westminster of really believing this, but it is nevertheless
the conclusion to which the logic of their language
seems inevitably to lead.

preaching the Gospel to the heathen. And in practice the proponents of the new apologetic unconsciously admit this when they borrow from the idealistic logic of unbelievers in order to establish the
Anybody wishing to demonstrate, say, a theorem truth of Christian theism. The Apostle Paul once
in geometry can obviously do so without postulating admonished the Corinthians to "give no offense,
the existence of God; and to the Christian not en- neither to the Jews, nor to the Gentiles" (1 Cor.
gaged in special pleading it seems a matter of simple 10: 32). And concerning the unbeliever's capacity
truth that human beings are able to solve problems for being in touch with reality he tells us that "that
in geometry because God has made them that way, which may be known of God ... God hath shewed
not because they accept the Bible. 4 The fact that unto them . . . so that they are without excuse"
one believes that "the earth is the Lord's and the
(Romans 1). Now whether one wishes to think of
' fulness thereof" does not in itself make one more exthe
pagan's knowledge of God as revelation of some
pert in the science of physics, and an apologetic
kind
or as common grace is not particularly imwhose presuppositions involve the denial of that
obvious fact is simply not doing the job. Anyway, portant. And it may be that we need a refinement
it is evidently useless to argue that because a man of what Calvin and Kuiper have told us about this,
does not accept the Christian religion he cannot but there is no good evidence that the new apoloreally (i.e., ultimately, metaphysically) distinguish getics gives us that refinement.
an egg from a cucumber. That kind of thing gets
one nowhere, and there is no earthly use for it exv
cept, possibly, as an undergraduate exercise in makRegarding the general question of what believers
ing purely nominal and academic distinctions. 5 In- and unbelievers know and don't know, and in what
Gidentally, it is precisely that kind of thing which
in religion easily gets a man into a state of mind in resriect and to what extent they can "kno~ ,..truly,"
which he regards those who disagree with him on the only sensible way out would seem t~Xthat of
details, including his immediate associates, as be- recognizing degrees of knowledge and levels of
longing to the anti-Christian forces arrayed against ~tn1tli. What th:e.carpenfer·knows.abou:ralree-wKen
him. It is well to remember that although it is the he relates it to a house by means of his tools differs
part of philosophy to speculate, it is no less its part in kind and degree from what the physicist knows
to know when to stop speculating.
when he relates it to a bar of iron by means of some
atomic
theory or other. And what each knows is
The antithesis between the Christian way of life
true,
i.e.,
"true as far as it goes," as our friends o:f
and non-Christian ways can hardly be exaggerated,
but that does not mean that it cannot be made to look the new apologetic would say in their rarer mo~
a bit silly by Christians with a pet theory to defend. ments. The Scholastics realized long ago that truth
No Christian denies that the unbeliever in rejecting is a transcendental idea, and that its unity is only a
God's self-revelation is out of touch with reality. unity of analogy; that is to say, truth is different ::i.s
But there are, after all, degrees of being out of touch, it is applied to different realms. 0 There are many
and the unbeli~ver is not as a rule so out of touch as kinds of truth, and for each kind a different theory is
to cease being a man made in the image of God. And
probably necessary. Anyway, the theory that I must
as a bearer of God's image he would seem to have
check
up with God's knowledge before I can utteI
considerably in common with the believer. To him
any kind of truth at all is entirely useless. WheIJ
the idea of God as the creator and sustainer of the
universe is at least not meaningless, since otherwise the unbeliever-or the believer, for that matter~
he could hardly deny it. In fact, if the Christian and says that it is a sultry day because the temperature
the non-Christian had as little in common as the new and the humidity are thus and so, he is not substitut·
apologetic seems to imply, there would be no parti- ing himself for God as "the ultimate point of refer·
ence in predication," as the new apologetic has it. Hh
cular sense in doing apologetics, to say nothing of
point of reference is reality as he finds it and to thE
extent to which he finds it. Kierkegaard once de·
4> In fairness to Professor Van Til of Westminster Seminary
it should be stated that he seems recently to have repudiated fined truth in so far as human beings can be awarE
some of his earlier and more extreme assertions relative to the of it as "the tension of the whole individual in thE
present issue. And in his syllabi one occasionally finds such
statements as that created beings have a nature and· an activity presence of the object of his passionate thought.'
of their own, and that unbelievers have knowledge which is "true Evidently, this tension can always be translated int<
as far as it goes." Nevertheless, such statements are so ob- practice as when, for example, we link truth witl
viously out of character with the general tenor of his apologetic that one is justified in saying that they amount to little courage, fidelity, and charity. As men, as being:
more than lip service to what Dr. Kuyper and others have called created in God's image, we can know that if we de
common grace,
this or that particular deed, we shall be true to our
5> Something on a par with the alleged Mediaeval pastime of
trying to show by rational demonstration just how many angels
could dance on the point of a needle.

6

o> Which is something altogether different from saying tha
truth is relative.
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fear of mistake regard truth, truth for him, as fidelity
to himself as a bearer of the image of God, and fidelity to God as the Creator and Savior of that image.
C.D.B.

selves, and we need no general theory of truth to see
this. For the Christian truth is always something
beyond, something more than he at this particular
moment knows. In spite of that he can without

Professor Van Til's Apologetics
Jesse De Boer
Professor of Philosophy
University of Kentucky

Part 1: A Linguistic Bramble Patch
N a series of three papers I propose to offer a
critical study of a few phases in the theological
thought of Professor Cornelius Van Til. I consider this a job worth doing and have at present
sufficient leisure to get on with it. I wish to stress
that my purpose is to analyze and criticize. I certainly do not wish to protest against the fact that he
has been working to explain and defend the Reformed faith. Nor do I wish to encourage anyone
who inclines to suppose that there is no agreement
between Van Til and myself on many basic matters.
That would be a pure mistake. Though some readers are likely to make that mistake, I choose not to
use their time, by presenting summaries of whole
areas of Van Til's thought, to render that mistake
less likely. In these papers I set myself to criticize
certain fundamental ideas of Van Til which are in
my view confusing and dangerously misleading.

I

A note about the sources I have used. I make a
few references to Professor Van Til's lecture, The
Intellectual Challenge of the Gospel, delivered on
July 10, 1950, at Tyndale House in Cambridge, England, and published in London by the Tyndale Press.
The great bulk of my references are to three unpublished syllabi, viz., Apologetics (1951), An Introduction to Systematic Theology (1952), and
Christian-Theistic Evidences ( 1951). All quotations
will be identified by the use of an abbreviation for
the appropriate title plus a page notation. Professor
·Van Til has inspected a copy of all quotations from
the syllabi which I intended to use and has rendered
the service of considering whether they agreed with
his present thinking and of suggesting certain alterations and suppressions. For his kindness in undertaking this onerous task I wish to thank him
publicly. Readers who have access to the syllabi can
take notice of the alterations. Responsibility for
selecting and interpreting Van Til's statements, and
for the use made of them in my argument, belongs
of course to me.
I

The first thing to notice about Van Til's writing is
his habit of using military images in order to describe the work of an apologist. On the first page of
THE CALVIN FORUM
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Apol. he makes a comparison between modern warfare and the vindication of Christian theism. '~he
apologist must use many types of weapon, comparable to bayonets, rifles, machine guns, heavy cannon,
and atom bombs. Two pages later he likens apologet:ics to the messenger boy who carries maps and plans
from one general to another. One might profitably
wonder why these images arise in Van Til when he
is speaking, not of the Christian life, but of the
Christian scholar's labor at his desk and in the classroom to defend the Christian faith. From many of
Van Til's statements one learns that he considers
himself almost alone in presenting an unadulterated
version of Reformed apologetics. Again and again
he tries to show that the apologetics of such men as
Bavinck and Hepp is not quite pure enough. And
as for the work of Roman Catholics and non-Re··
formed Evangelicals, he says such things as the following. "Romanism and Evangelicalism . . . do not
seek to explode the last stronghold to which the natural man always flees and where he always makes
his final stand" (A pol. 59). "The natural man must
be forced out of his hideouts, his caves, his last lurking places. Neither Roman Catholic nor Arminian
methodologies have the flame-throwers with which
to reach him. In the all out war between the Christian and the natural man as he appears in modern
garb it is only the atomic energy of a truly Reformed methodology that will explode the last
Festung to which the Roman Catholic and the Arminian always permit him to retreat and to dwell in
safety" (Apol. 66). No doubt this is bracing talk,
and spiced by a show of familiarity with the world's
newest and the most horrible weapons. But there
is a real danger that people who talk themselves
into the mentality characteristic of war, or slide into
it, are likely to grasp at any weapon and to stick at
no means for achieving their ends. Surely the end
of apologetics is to clarify and defend the truth; it is
not destruction. Surely also the man who thinks
of apologetics on the analogy of getting at someone
. with a flame-thrower is in danger both of blinding
himself to the standards of discussion and of controversy, and also of violating what Christ said and
did with respect to sinful men.
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Perhaps I am pressing too hard on Van Til's
metaphors. I bring them forward only to raise the
question whether this peculiar quality of his writing
indicates some quality of his mind. And if the
metaphors ought not to be pressed, then they serve
as samples of what I consider to be his carelessness
in the use of language. I proceed to deal with this
at some length.
II
At one point he gives us the phrase "the judicious
Butler" (Apol. 60). This enshrines a minor literary
slip; it is Hooker, not Butler, who has come to be
honored with the term "judicious." At another
point he hopelessly muddies the waters in which
philosophers have sought to make a precise distinction between the terms "analytic" and "synthetic."
This distinction appears quite clearly in Kant, who
said that a statement is analytic if its predicate is
contained in the meaning of the subject term. E.g.
"A puppy is a young dog." Van Til, however, represents Kant as saying that analytic knowledge is
introspection, inspection of one's own internal states.
This is simply off the mark. Perhaps Van Til is confusing two uses of the term "subject," once as the
logical subject of a sentence, and once as referring
to the person who performs the act of self-inspection.
I have no objection to Van Til's saying that God's
self-knowledge is "analytic" in the sense that "God
does not need to look beyond himself for additions
to his knowledge" (Apol. 6). But it would be silly
to pretend that the term "analytic" as so used bears
any resemblance to the strict use of Kant or of a
contemporary logician; and if one did understand
this term, whenever Van Til uses it, as a logician
understands it, he might be wise to hesitate before
applying it to God's self-knowledge.
Van Til proceeds to say about God's knowledge
of "the things that exist beside himself" (Is "beside"
equivalent to "next to" or "in addition to?" Van T1l
does not pause to say.) that it "precedes these facts."
This "precedes,"he adds, is to be taken logically, not
temporally. Here he gives himself occasion to go
through a beautiful exercise in the use of language,
in using words so carefully that they do not temporalize God's knowledge of natural events or eternalize the events known by God. But he disappoints; instead of pursuing precision, he lapses into
popular obscurity and declines the gambit. From
man's point of view, he says, it is correct to say that
God knows the facts before they occur. "God knows
or interprets the facts before they are facts" (Apol.
6). Elsewhere he states, " .... there once was no a
posteriori aspect to knowledge at all (i.e. no natural
events). When God existed alone, there was no time
universe, and there were no new facts arising." "In
fact, we believe that the world once upon a time did
not exist" (I. S. Theol. 10). I submit that this is
nothing but loose talk. A theologian can do better
than this. There is no insuperable difficulty in conforming language to the doctrine that time was
8

created with the natural world and that God's existence is supertemporal. One does not have to use
such expressions as "when God existed alone" or
"before God created the world" or "God knows the
facts before they are facts" or "once upon a time the
world did not exist." It is true to say that God
knows what will occur tomorrow; it is not true to
say that God knows today what will occur tomorrow.
It is improper to date God's knowledge.
In a context in which he has just referred to man's
having been created in God's image Van Til adds
that man "was organically related to the universe
about him" (Apol. 15). The term "organic" is sufficiently vague to leave the statement quite useless:
by itself it does not indicate whether the connection
from man to nature is from higher to lower, or vice
versa; or again, it would be far from safe to picture
an enormous organ in which man shares the role of
an organ or cell with the other items in nature. What
Van Til means is not clear until one reads the following sentence: "Man was to be prophet, priest
and king under God in this created universe." The
term "organic" is by no means suited to signify all
this, and the sentence quoted which contains it is
both superfluous and misleading. And what does
Van Til mean by saying that all non-Christian
theories relate man incidentally or accidentally to
the rest of creation? Does he include Judaism and
Islam in the list of non-Christian theories? Even the
Greek conception of man as unique because he is able
to exercise logos and as representing a higher actualization of functions shared by man with the
brutes is far from asserting an accidental relation of
man to the sub-human order. Of course, the terms
"accidental" and "incidental" are not defined; one
suspects that Van Til uses them to disparage, not to.
characterize. Judging from one of his images, I am
led to conclude that Van Til has little inclination to
think highly of logos. Speaking of reason as the instrument of a person, he likens it to a saw. "Whether
it will move at all and whether it will cut in the right
direction depends on the man operating it" (ApoL
49). I suggest that the material also has something
to do with whether the saw will move and with the
direction in which it cuts. Suppose that I choose to
take Lewis Carroll's Cheshire cat into the laboratory
for study; could my reason make a start? Or suppose that someone has chosen to study the properties
of triangles; what is the point of saying that the
student can determine the direction to be taken in
proving that the interior angles of a triangle amount
to 180 degrees? That I should turn my thought to
triangles I can decide; but if I am to prove the
theorem I must submit to the triangle. And this
determination by the object applies to both the regenerate and the unregenerate person: the two do
not differ on the definition and properties of. a
triangle; they do not have to differ on the philosophical questions raised by the development of nonEuclidean geometries. If reason were quite like a
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""saw, Van Til's metaphor might be more useful than
it is in supporting his general thesis that reason "will
invariably act wrongly" (Apol. 50) unless its possessor is regenerate. This metaphor is a bit too
slippery to do much good, and that is at present my
sole point.
More serious inaccuracy and looseness of speech
are found in Van Til's numerous statements that the
face of God is visible everywhere. The covenant
idea, says Van Til, means that we can "see God's
face everywhere" (Apol. 26), and this idea is significant for philosophy and science as well as for theology. " ... the face of God appears in all the facts
and principles with which philosophy and science
deal" (Apol. 27). The objects of science bear the
"imprint of God's face." Creation is like a great
estate: the owner's name is "plainly and indelibly
written at unavoidable places." Or it is like a sheet
of inlaid linoleum, bearing on its surface a pattern
which penetrates to the bottom (Apol. 61). All
these statements are metaphorical, and not one of
them is explained. They all liken recognition of God
to visual sensation. But of course I do not see God
in the same way as I see the color or visual shape of
a tree. What is it that I see when I see God, and
with what sort of eye? I consider that Van Til neglects his duty as a theologian when he entirely fails
to answer this question. This is one of the most
fundamental questions in theology; and certainly
the apologist has a special responsibility to discuss
it. And if science is engaged in discovering and
formulating relations of sequence between natural
events which are observable by the senses or by instruments which improve upon the senses, and if
Van Til never spells out exactly what the face of
God looks like when the scientist studies his proper
object, he has nothing to justify the reprimand he
administers to the physicist who does not refer to
God as one factor in an analysis of light. I do not
dispute that every item of the created world is an
instance of God's creative and sustaining efficacy.
Of course it is! I wish only to point out that Van
Til offers only a misleading metaphor where what
is needed is a penetrating piece of philosophical
theology, an analysis of what it is in an object that
justifies my saying that it is a creature. Whatever
this may be, it is not something like a color or shape
or scent, and my apprehension of it is rathe:r different from vision or smell.
Another metaphor of Van Til's is perhaps still
more tricky. Comparing the search for truth to
traveling on a highway built (presumably) by God,
Van Til speaks of the Christian following road signs
which are perfectly plain to sight. Non-Christians,
he says, travel in the opposite direction on the same
road, and follow other road signs ( Apol. 73). Not
only does Van Til leave one quite in the dark about
what the Christian's road signs are and by what
"sense" one "sees" them (so far the metaphor is on
a level with the others); now he adds that the nonTHE CALVIN FORUM
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Christian also has' road signs which point the way
toward a precipice. This addition is a startling
fantasy. If creation consists of items all of which
reveal God, there should be no items to point the
wrong way.
Perhaps Van Til intends to say that the natural
man has himself installed the road signs to which
he can point. It is clear at any rate that Van TiJ'
wants to deny (at least on most occasions) tha
Christians and non-Christians share a common are
of knowledge. He says that "the knower himsel
needs interpretation (i.e. by God-some are regenerate, others not) as well as the things he knows.
The human mind, !t i~ gg~~~£2!!?:!£Qn!y,"xg~ggn!_~~,~
makes its contribution to the knowledge it obtains"
(Apol. 39). Let me point up the argument. It is
now commonly recognized, says Van Til, that the
human mind makes its contribution to knowledge.
God has taught us that there is a radical difference
between the regenerate and the unregenerate person. They will therefore make different contributions to their respective knowledge. Consequently
the Christian and the non-Christian do not share a
common area of knowledge. Of these four sentences, the first is Kantian in origin: Van Til relies
on or borrows from Kant in order to give evidence
for one of his central theses. This is a startling procedure unless he can be confident that Kant formula
is derivable from Christian principles. He says)
nothing to show that it is. (Does the Bible teach
that the radical difference between regenerate and
unregenerate people is such that they do not share
the same algebra or numismatics or meteorology?)•
Further, the term "contribution" is left quite unspecified, with the result that one cannot tell where
to look for evidence of the truth or falsity of Van
Til's statement. What contribution does the regenerate man make to his apprehension, e.g., that the
grass is wet or that a triangle is a plane figure
formed by three straight lines intersecting by twos
at three points? How can I divine whether Van
Til's sentence is such that to assert it or to deny it
says anything? Yet it is such undisciplined, virtually insignificant talk as this that Van Til puts
forward to justify his thesis that except by presupposing the deepest principles of Christian thought
one cannot know the character of any facts.
Another passage in which Van Til def ends the
thesis just noted contains such linguistic barbarisms
as "factness of the fact" and "factness as facts."
" ... there is one system of reality of which all that
exists forms a part. And any individual fact of this
system is what it is primarily because of its relation
to this system. It is therefore a contradiction in
terms to speak of presenting certain facts to men
unless one presents them as parts of this system.
The very factness of any individual fact of history
(Van Til has just referred to Christ's resurrection)
is precisely what it is because God is what he is....
God makes the facts to be what they are" (Apol. 99).
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Since I have no means of discovering what characteristic of a fact is designated by the term "factness,"
I may be excused for not knowing what Van Til is
trying to say. Suppose I wanted to deny what Van
Til says: just what would I be doing, how would I
go about doing it? Furthermore, what is meant by
speaking as if God's perfect existence, His creative
act, His eternal counsel and providential rule, are
parts of a system in which apples and amoebae are
also parts, and in which all parts are what they are
because of their relation to all other parts? Does
God derive His nature from apples? If God "makes"
the facts, I should think that they are not parts of a
system in which God is also a part, and that the tie
between God and facts is precisely not a logical one.
Van Til's use of this vague idealistic language, borrowed perhaps from the idealistic logicians whose
works he studied years ago, ought to be disconcerting to a Reformed mind, in fact to any Christian.
On the topic of Van Til's use of idealistic language
I shall speak more fully later.
One last instance of linguistic vagueness. I quote
from Apol. 19. "The question of knowledge is an
ethical question. It is indeed possible to have theoi retically correct knowledge about God without lovl1 ing God. The devil illustrates this point. Yet what
1 is meant by knowing God in Scripture is knowing
1 and loving God: this is true knowledge of God; all
\ other knowledge of God is basically false." In the
' manner of the doctor who says to his colleague, "My
\patient Smith has a beautiful case of pneumonia,''
j I say that. this passage is a beautiful case of capi, talizing on ambiguity. Not only is it the barest impropriety to conjoin the two terms "false" and
\ "knowledge" (knowledge is by definition true, and
to say it is, is to utter only a tautology); Van Til
even drops into the pit of equating "false knowledge"
with "theoretically correct knowledge." Furthermore, he concedes the point of my remarks by using
two words, "knowing' and "loving," in order to state
the meaning of "knowing" as it is used in Scripture.
Then there is a distinction between knowing and
loving. And if the devil wouldn't quite get his due
unless the term "knowing" were applied to him, I
, wonder what is due to Aristotle. Now, if this distinction has to be acknowledged, I call attention to the
fact that this passage obscures the whole point of
. Van Til's oft-stated and basic thesis that the unrei generate man can know no facts at all. Granted that
\he does not both know and love God, does it follow
:that he knows no fact at all, even that he does not
11know God, in the sense in which "know" is distinct,
\on Van Til's own showing, from "know and love"?
lin a later paper I hope to discuss this issue at length.

in achieving a radical purism or exclusiveness. It istherefore surprising to notice how he slips into the
use of phrases and arguments collected from nonChristian sources. I call attention to Aristotelian
formulae and to phrases and arguments which are at
home only among speculative idealists.
The use of Aristotelian phrases is striking because
of the numerous statements Van Til makes to the
effect that the God of non-Christians is not God at
all. "Any God that is not the Father of our Lord
Jesus Christ is not God but an idol" (Apol. 36).
Again, "Any other sort of God is no God at all and
to "prove" that some other sort of God exists is to
"prove" that no God exists" (Apol. 14). I shall not
take time to discuss the question of what Van Til
would say about the God of Judaism; my interest is
restricted to Aristotle, and on this topic Van Til
says: "No greater contrast is thinkable than that between the unmoved noesis noeeseoos of Aristotle and
the Christian God" (I. S. Theol. 216; also see Challenge 8). Whether one can think of a greater contrast
is for each to judge: one has to be rather ignorant o:f
the history of religions to find this dictum useful.
.The fact is that Van Til characterizes the Christian
!God in the exact terms of Aristotle. It is Aristotle
!who elaborated the distinction between potentiality
!and actuality and made possible the familiar formul~a in which God is spoken of as pure act, actus purus.
This is what Van Til says: "In the being of God ...
possibility is identical with reality and potentiality
is identical with actuality" (Apol. 6). It is Aristotle
who coined the phrase noesis noeeseoos; Van Til
says: "God is self-conscious activity" (I. S. Theol.
178). "For it is God knowing himself that is God.
And God is God knowing himself. God is God's selfaffirmation. God is God's eternal self-affirmation.
God is pure act" (I. S. Theol. 171). It would be easy
to exult over this sample of confused discussion. It.
is more important to adopt a critical attitude toward
iVan Til's violent attacks on non-Christian thinkers:
,why should Aristotle's formulae have less truth
!when Aristotle proposes them than when Van Til
lrepeats them? If Aristotle's God is no God at all,
1what must be said of the Christian God Whom Van
ITil defines in the exact words of Aristotle?

I should have expected Van Til to point out that
!Aristotle's definition of God is defective because it
}lefines God as the actuality of consciousness rather
jlthan as the actuality of being. After all, Augustine
1
and Aquinas put forward this correction. Perhaps
iVan Til has imbibed so freely of the potion of modern idealism that this basic Christian objection to
Aristotle's theology does not seem significant to him.
Evidences for my conjecture are scattered throughout Van Til's writings, in the many passages in
III
which his dominant interest seems to be directed toVan Til sets what he considers a Reformed mode ward the cognitive function of God. In common
of thought in opposition to all other Christian modes; with the majority of post-Renaissance philosophers
in fact, he strives to outdo all other Reformed writers Van Til is exercised by the problem of knowledge.
10
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I do not wish to discuss such a general topic as the
symptoms in Van Til of kinship with modern epistemologists. Instead, I want to point out specifically
how he uses terms and arguments borrowed from
speculative idealism, and thereby to underline my
view that he is skating on thin ice; his purism is
turning into a boomerang. For modern idealism is
no friend of Christianity. Hegel and his followers
were busy building huge systems of thought to revise or displace Christian belief, and assumed the
role of preachers of new principles of culture.

12). The first clause is confusing and on one interpretation is certainly false. If "implied in" means
"implied by," if it has the force of saying that God's
nature logically entails His creation of a world (and
this is the first and natural interpretation), then Van
Til is saying that the world has come from God by a
logical necessity of His nature, which is to deny the
doctrine of free creation. Now, of course, Van Til
repeatedly states the classic doctrine of God's selfsufficiency and of His freedom in creating the world.
I mean only to say that his language is idealistic, and

·~,

I begin with a detached use of a term which may l
have no importance beyond that of a minor symp-\ that by choosing to use such language he chooses to
tom. Van Til says: " ... we offer the God and the\ make idealistic, non-Christian statements.
~hrist of t~e Bible as the concrete .un~;ersal in re~a- \ When he discusses logic or method Van Til again
hon to which all facts have meanmg (C. T. Evid. l relies on the idealists. One frequently finds such a
67). ;,f I underst~nd. what the term "c;oi:crete ur~i- \ phrase as "the internal coherence of God's nature"
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theory of truth, which, by the way, has never sucsynthesis is this concrete developing world or Whole
ceeded, except by resorting to ambiguity and ad hoc
in which God and nature are complementary astheoretical patchwork, in showing that there is a
pects. It is dangerous to use the term "concrete
relation of implication between such sentences as
universal" when speaking of the God of Christian
"I have a headache" and "Yesterday President Eisenfaith. Hegelianism characterizes the Ultimate Whole
hower held a press conference."
as a system of thought. Van Til says, "For Chris··
Van Til does actually repeat characteristic idealist
tianity, God's thought is constitutive." The term
."constitutive" is Kantian; is Van Til careful to avoid statements in logic. "We may speak of the method of
the sens~ of Kantian terms or the sense made of them Christian theism as being the method of implication''
by idealists? 'The next sentence is vague and mis- (I. S. Theol. 8). Bosanquet repudiated what he called
leading: "By God's thoughts, as expressed through "linear inference" in order to replace it by a logic of
his will, do the facts of the universe come into ex- "implication," a logic proceeding on the hypothesis
istence" (C. T. Evid. 57). What kind of causality is that men approach reality only through judgments
ascribed to God's thoughts in the expression "by and that judgments have their place as elements in
God's thoughts"? I should be happier than I am a total system all the parts of which mutually supwith this expression if Van Til were obviously fami- port one another by logical or quasi-logical relations.
liar with an Aristotelian or medieval analysis of It is perfectly obvious (see I. S. Theol. 14, Note 2)
kinds of causes. In order to remove the idealist un- that Van Til refuses to follow Bosanquet's logical
dertones of this sentence it would be sufficient to method toward its climax in absolute idealism (in
attach the word "by" to the expression "his will." fact, it is idealist metaphysics that "justifies" idealSurely the Christian doctrine of creation is anti- ist logic). Then why does he repeat with approval
idealistic. Van Til says elsewhere: "The creation the idealist formulae? My guess is that he considers
doctrine is implied in the God-concept of Christian- idealist logic to be handy weapon for the defense of
ity; deny the creation doctrine and you have vir- his twisted and purist version of Reformed apolotually denied the Christian concept of God" (ApoL getics. Actually it is a boomerang.

I

THE CALVIN FORUM

* * *

AUGUST, SEPTEMBER, 1953

11

It is Van Til who says: " ... all reasoning is, in the
nature of the case, circular reasoning" (Apol. 63).
He goes so far as to write,"without th.e presupposition of the truth of Christian theism no fact can be
distinguished from any other fact. To say this is
to apply the method of idealist logicians in a way
that these idealist logicians, because of their own
anti-Christian theistic assumptions, cannot apply it.
The point made by these logicians is that even the
mere counting of particular things presupposes a
system of truth of which these particulars form a
part. Without such a system of truth there would
be no distinguishable difference between one particular and another. They would be as impossible to
distinguish from one another as the millions of
drops of water in the ocean would be indistinguishable from one another by the naked eye" (Apol. 7475).

To start off simply, one cannot distinguish the
drops of water in the ocean because these drops are
not distinct, i.e. separated. It is easy, however, to
bring about distinctness by using a dropper. Further,
what is the system of truth which one must presuppose in order to count two pencils? Is God a "part"
of this system? And does the Mohammedan find
it difficult to distinguish a hawk from a handsaw?
Until one learns the answer to such questions, what
use can he make of Van Til's dicta? Finally, is it
not entirely improper for Van Til, the Reformed
purist who really wants to avoid sharing common
insights with non-Christians, to defend his interpretation of what Christianity implies by an appeal to
idealist logic? The statement by which one justifies
or defends another statement must be better known
than the latter statement; so Van Til is more certain
of idealist logic than he is of Christian theism. His
position is a fine subject for irony. In talking as if
God is "part" of a "system of truth" Van Til is talking himself out of classic Christian modes of thought.
He is entirely too naive to be trusted in his dealings
with idealists. Here is a passage which uncritically

12

restates and accepts, and uses for the defense of
Christian theism, a particularly bad point of the
British neo-Hegelian, F. H. Bradley. " ... even that
which the intellect does assert about the objects of
knowledge (i.e. changing, temporal objects) is, on
the non-Christian view, of necessity involved in
contradiction. F. H. Bradley's great book Appearance and Reality has brought out this point with the
greatest possible detail. ... The point is ... that in
the nature of the case all logical assertion with respect to the world of temporal existence must needs
be self-contradictory in character" (Apol. 83). In
the first part of the book Bradley applied at great
length the dialectic of Parmenides and Zeno. An
adequate answer to all three, Bradley, Parmenides,
and Zeno, can be found in Aristotle's pointed remark
that Parmenides found change contradictory only
because he embraced the mistaken assumption that
nothing can exist unless it exists in the manner of
perfect Being or actuality. Aristotle did not embrace
this erroneous assumption, non-Christian though he
was. Hence Van Til is entirely wrong when he says:
"On the assumptions of the natural man logic is a
timeless impersonal principle .... It is by means of
universal timeless principles of logic that the natural man must, on his assumptions, seek to make
intelligible assertions about the world of reality or
chance. But this cannot be done without falling
into self-contradiction" (Apol. 83-84). Well, I take it
that Aristotle was a "natural man." He simply did not
practice logic or metaphysics in the manner in which
Van Til says that the natural man must do. What Van
Til calls "timeless principles of logic' are really post-•
ulates about the character of being; they are metaphysical dogmas, not principles of logic at all. They
are idealistic principles, and Van Til is far from free
of them. Therefore I give warning that he is in
·danger of substituting idealism for Christianity.
NoTE: This is the first of a series of three articles by Professor Jesse De Boer on the new Westminster apologetics. The
others will appear in the October and November issues of the
FoRUM.-Editors.
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On Brute Facts
Clifton J. Orlebeke
Instructor In Philosophy
University of Rhode Island

PISTEMOLOGICAL problems are notoriously
complex and technical. Yet for Christian
philosophy, as for philosophy in general, their
answers are not only intrinsically important,
but have far-reaching consequences in metaphysics,
ethics, and the other branches of philosophical inquiry. That a critique of knowled~e logically pr~
cedes, or is identical with, metaphysics may be seriously doubted, but the important role of epistemology in a comprehensive world-view is indisputable.

no brute facts, and (B) Therefore there is no common knowledge possessed impartially by Christian
and non-Christian. Each of these propositions
should be elaborated.

E

Calvinists have never challenged the validity of
the philosophical task, and therefore they should
also realize the value of a sound theory of knowledge. They have a right to expect from epistemology considerable light on the problem of common
grace, the philosophy of Christian education, method
in apology for the Faith, and the antithesis between
believer and unbeliever. Nor are these questions of
merely academic interest, as their recurrence in
contemporary discussion shows. Underlying them
all is the problem of Truth: what is its origin and
nature, and how shall we best attain it? Granted
the antithesis between lovers and haters of God,
shall. we deny the possession of partial truth to the
latter? If so, what is the significance of common
grace?

(A) A brute fact, according to Professor Van Til,
is an uninterpreted fact. Such a fact is unintelligible
because it is unstructured, "raw,'' and unrelated to
anything else. 1 But as Christians we know that no
facts are brute facts, since every fact derives meaning from its place in the plan of God. Thus every
fact is pre-interpreted by God, and the task of
human thought is to reinterpret the facts within the
limits of finitude, in the same way as does God. 2
(B) Every non-Christian errs in his initial supposition ·that God does not exist, and therefore that
there are brute facts. He absolutizes his own mind,
attempts to impose complete rationality on the facts,
but always fails because he has not begun with God.
Consequently every proposition which he utters is
false in so far as this proposition is part of a godless
system. This last point is made by Professor Van
Til as follows:
Now it may seem as though it is straining at a gnat to
insist on the point that the 'natural man' does not even
know the flowers truly, as long as it is maintained that he
does not kno\v God truly. The point is, however, that unless we maintain that the 'natural man' does not know the
flowers truly we cannot logically maintain that he does
not know God truly. All knowledge is inter-related. The
created world is expressive of the nature of God. If one
knows 'nature' truly, one also knows nature's God truly.
Then, too, the mind of man is a unit. It cannot. know one
thing truly without knowing all things truly. 3 )

Much of our awareness of these and other issues,
and their relation to epistemology, can be credited to
Professor Cornelius Van Til of Westminster Theological Seminary. Although much of his work has not
been published, American Calvinists have become acIf the Christian should attempt to reason with the
quainted through other media with the fact that
unbeliever on the basis of "neutral" facts, he would
Professor Van Til has elaborated a point of viev1
tacitly be conceding the existence of brute facts, and
which is in a real sense novel. He has, further, inthereby vitiating his own position. The only efsisted that epistemology is the key to his system.
fective apology for Christianity is based on the twoIn this article I shall attempt an analysis and
fold method of presupposition, destructive and concriticism of one facet of Professor Van Til's episstructive:
temology, namely his treatment of factuality. AlThe Christian apologist must place himself upon the posithough they will necessarily be incomplete, my comtion of his opponent, assuming the correctness of _his method
ments are still, I believe, fundamental in impormerely for argument's sake, in order to show him that on
such a position the "facts" are not facts ~n~ the "laws"
tance, since the subject of factuality is crucial in
not laws. He must also ask the non-Christian to pla?e
Professor Van Til's system. My purpose is simply
himself upon the Christian position for argument's sake m
to contribute to the contemporary discussion of a
order that he may be shown that only upon such a basis do
"facts" and "laws" appear intelligible. 4 )
much-debated problem from a philosophical point
of view. No finality is claimed for the following
It can be seen even from this cursory survey that
remarks.
Professor Van Til draws momentous conclusions
I
1l Cf. Common Grace, page 4.
2) Apologetics (unpublished~, page 35.
.
Much of Professor Van Til's argument in episte3) Introduction to Systematic Theology (unpublished), p. 27.
mology can, I believe, be compressed into a single
4> Apologetics, page 63. Does this method presuppose a compremise and a conclusion as follows: (A) There are mon criterion of intelligibilty? It would appear so.
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from his premise concerning brute fact. His denial
of any common ground is, as he recognizes, in conflict with some of the opinions held by Kuyper,
Bavinck, Hepp, and the "Old Princeton" school and
he has not hesitated to criticize them. Each of them,
says Professor Van Til, has in places failed to accept
the full implications of the absolute ethical antithesis
as it affects knowledge, and in so doing they have
all made inconsistent concessions to non-Christian
methodology. 5
In view of these considerations,
then, it would seem profitable to re-examine the
matter of factuality.
A fact is "a state of affairs," "that which is the
case," or "an aspect of reality." We commonly
distinguish facts, which are what they are, from propositions or judgments which ref er to facts. Propositions have mental existence, but their function
is not to exist as such, but to be of or about something. Therefore only propositions can be true or
false, in so far as they do or do not conform to that
which is real. The notions of truth and falsity would
have no meaning, were it not for this distinction between Thought and Being, or between noetic being
and being as an object of knowledge. 6
Considered abstractly, then, a "fact" is neither interpreted nor uninterpreted, neither intelligible nor
"brute," i.e., unintelligible. This is clearly seen from
the fact that the questions "are all facts already preinterpreted ?" and "are there brute facts?" are
genuine, meaningful questions. However, it is essential to Christian Theism to answer the first of
these questions affirmatively and the second negatively. God, who is Being and Truth, has created,
by a free act of his sovereign Will, a cosmos which
really is, but whose being is dependent upon his own
Being. Becaµs~ this is so, the cosmos is completely
and intrinsi~ally intelligible, and is known exhaustively and comprehensively by Him. Because He
makes all facts to be what they are, He knows them
as they are. All facts are, indeed, pre-interpreted
by Him in a divine System of knowledge. There are
no brute facts, no surprises for God.
Because man as knower is also a creation of God,
he is able to understand that which is real. But
human knowledge is bound by human finitude, and
therefore can never be exhaustive or comprehensive.
Man is commanded to understand, t9 interpret facts.
But these facts are pre-interpreted by God, and
therefore man's knowledge, in so far· as it is true,
will be analogical to God's knowledge. No human
system of knowledge, however excellent, can be
identical with the divine System; nor, on the other
hand, will it be completely different from the divine
System. This is the meaning of analogy: the term

Several things in this passage bear comment. ( 1)
Professor Van Til approves of using Kant to refute
Hume. So far forth, of course, this is entirely
legitimate. Much depends, though, on what particular doctrine of ;Kant is in question. (2) The nature of the "necessary connection" between the fact
and its knower is not entirely clear. If it is meant·
that no fact can have meaning to some mind unless
it be known by that mind, the statement is tautologous and requires no proof. On the other hand, if
it is meant that no fact can be without being observed or interpreted by some mind, then the argument is a non sequitur. From the fact that no ·une
heard the tree fall it does not follow that there was
no sound, unless "sound" be defined as someone's
auditory perception. The same holds, mutatis
mutandis, for any fact: given that no one understands or is aware of some fact, it does not follow
that the fact does not exist, nor does it follow that
the fact is not capable of being known (i.e., intelligible). To deny this is to affirm that there is no
meaningful distinction between being and beingknown, and to accept the standard epistemological
argument for idealism. (3) This brings to mind
what may be significant in the appeal to Kant. His
refutation of Hume was logically dependent upon
the doctrine that mind is constructive in the act of
knowing-a doctrinE) which, with the elimination of
the thing-in-itself, is idealism. 8 •

-5> An extensive criticism of Kuyper, Bavinck, and Hepp appears under the rubric "The Danger of Abstract Thinking" in
Common Grace, pages 34-64. Dr. William Masselink has defended these men in his mimeographed Common Grace arid
Christian Education (1951).
6> The use of "fact" to denote a true proposition is a derivative sense of "fact."

Christian-Theistic Evidences (unpublished), page 37.
s> Compare also: "Everyone who reasons about facts comes
to those facts with a schematism into which he fits the facts."
Ibid., page 38.
"The human mind, it is now commonly recognized, as the
knowing subject, makes its contribution to the knowledge it
obtains." Apol., page 39.
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"knowledge" as applied to God and man respectively, is neither univocal nor equivocal.
II
If this be granted, Professor Van Til's disjunction
between "brute facts" and "interpreted facts" would
seem to be faulty. To say that all facts are intrinsically intelligible and that all facts are divinely understood .and pre-interpreted is to state two distinct
(and true) propositions. But the intelligibility of
fact is not the same as the being-interpreted of fact,
unless one is prepared to affirm as well that the being
of a fact is identical with the being-known of a fact.
While Professor Van Til has never, to my knowledge, defended explicitly the latter thesis-and, indeed, sometimes presupposes its falsity-there is
evidence that he has been influenced by it. Consider, e.g., the following passage:
There are others, however, who use Kant in order to refute Hume, and then seek to refute Kant with Kant. These
men think, and we believe think correctly, that every appeal made to baTe fact is unintelligible. EveTy fact must
stand in relation to other facts or it means nothing to anyone. We may argue at length whether there is a noise. in
the woods when a tree falls even if no one is there to hear
it, but there can be no reasonable argument about the fact
that even if there be a noise, it means nothing to anyone.
There is, therefore, a necessary connection between the
facts and the observer or interpreter of facts. 7>

7>
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It may be objected, at this point, that Professor
Van Til distinguishes emphatically between the preinterpretation of all facts by God, which renders
them meaningful, and the re-interpretation of these
facts by the human mind. Indeed, it is precisely the
sin of the "natural man" that he "wants to be creatively constructive instead of receptively reconstructive." 9 Nevertheless the point remains evident
that Professor Van Til's theory of knowledge involves construction by the mind of some kind, and
that this construction adds something essential to
otherwise meaningless facts.

III
There is a further aspect of Professor Van Til's
theory of fact which is essential to his contention
that there is no epistemological common ground between believer and unbeliever. This is his insistence
upon the interrelatedness of facts. We have seen already that Professor Van Til does not admit the
truth of any proposition uttered by the "natural
man" for the reason that "all knowledge is interrelated" in such a way that "the mind of man ...
cannot know one thing truly without knowing all
things truly.'

This raises an interesting but difficult question
which I cannot treat in any detail. The question is
this: what relation obtains between the knowledg?!";
of God and the being of created facts? Orthodox /1
Christianity has maintained that the cosmos came,
into existence by virtue of a divine creative act, and/
that this existence is continuously maintained by 1
divine power. It has also held that God has a com-!
prehensive plan for history, and that every event[
occurs according to His will in conformity with thatj
plan. Further, God necessarily knows, comprehen-\
sively and exhaustively, every fact, whether past, I
present, or future. In harmony with these truths I
Professor Van Til says:

Similarly, in Common Grace Professor Van Til
objects vigorously to Kuyper's statement that there
is a "common territory (i.e. measuring, weighing,
counting) where the difference in starting-point and
standpoint does not count." His main criticism is as
follows:

Scripture teaches that every fact in the universe exists
and operates by virtue of the plan of God. There are no
brute facts for God. As to His own being, fact and interpretation are co-extensive. . . . And as to the universe,
God's interpretation logically precedes the denotation and
connotation of all facts of which it consists. lOl

Somewhat more radical, however is a later assertion that "For Christianity, God's thought is constitutive. By God's thoughts do the facts of the universe come into existence." 11 There lurks here a
curious ambiguity. It is one thing to say that God's
thought logically prece9es facts, and another thing
to say that God's thoughts enter into the being of
facts. Are we to underntand that the knowledge of
God cannot qe.distinguished from the objects of that
knowledge? If It is possible to say that God's
thought is constitutive of facts, is it not also necessary to say that facts are constitutive of God's knowledge, and therefore of God? In order to maintain a
sharp distinction between God and His creation it
would seem necessary to make a sharp distinction between the being of created reality, and God's knowledge of it. Here is the dilemma: either there are
created objects existentially other than God which
are the objects of His knowledge, or there are not.
If there are, then it seems inaccurate to say that
God's thoughts are constitutive of these objects in
the same sense in which he knows them, unless the
being of these objects is identical with their being
objects of His knowledge. If there are not such
beings, the creator-creature distinction is lost.
I. S. 'J.'., page 26.
Evidences, page 53. Italics in original.
11l Ibid., page 57. Italics mine.
01

Weighing and measuring and formal reasoning are but
aspects of one unified act of interpretation. It is either
the would-be autonomous man, who weighs and measures
what he thinks of as brute or bare facts by the help of
what he thinks of as abstract impersonal principles, or it
is the believer, knowing himself to be a creature of God,
who weighs and measures what he thinks of as God-created
facts and by what he thinks of as God-created laws. Looking at the matter thus allows for a farger "common" territory than Kuyper allows for, but this larger territory is
common with a qualification . • • (it) allows us to do
full justice to "antithesis," which Kuyper has taught us
to stress. It keeps us from falling into a sort of natural theology, patterned after Thomas Aquinas, that Kuyper has taught us to reject. 12>

I have quoted this passage at length to show the
importance which Professor Van Til attaches to the
question of "common ground." Because Kuyper
believed in such a thing, he is charged with tendencies toward Thomistic natural theology. It is
necessary, then, to examine this contention.
Let us consider Professor Van Til's own illustration. Suppose an unbeliever and a Christian are together in a field and they notice a flower which we
shall name "A." The unbeliever says that flower A
is exactly two inches from flower B. His friend, who
happens to carry a pocket-ruler, measures the distance and verifies the judgment. He is likely to say
to the unbeliever, "That was a good guess; your
judgment is true." Obviously the latter does not
know God truly; yet it is paradoxical to deny that he
did not correctly judge concerning one relation sustained by that flower.
There are times when Professor Van Til seems to
admit this point. He says, for example, "We are
well aware of the fact that non-Christians have a
great deal of knowledge about this world which is
true as far as it goes. That is, there is a sense in
which we can and must allow for the value of knowledge of non-Christians. This has always been a

10>
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Common Grace, page 44.
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difficult point." 13 On the other hand, we are told
that "No sinner can interpret reality aright" 14 and
that "the natural man cannot know the flowers
truly." Finally, there is Professor Van Til's outright rejection of Kuyper's thesis regarding common
ground.
It seems to me that there are certain considerations which tend to clear up this ambiguity. The
flower in the field stands in relation to an indefinite
number of beings other than flower B. The precise
nature of these relations is willed and known by
God, and this complex fact is revelatory of God. If
a human being is to "know" this flower with essential
accuracy, he must know it as a creation of God, revelatory of his wisdom, power, and glory. "From
this ultimate point of view the 'natural man' knows
nothing truly," 15 and from this same ultimate point
of view the Christian knows everything truly. But
it does not follow from the foregoing that every bit
of knowledge held by the unbeliever is for that reason false, except from the "ultimate point of view."
That is to say, concerning the spatial relation of
flower A to B alone, the unbeliever can have true
knowledge as far as it goes, and the believer can be
wrong about that same relation as far as that relation is concerned. Such would be the case if the
Christian should, perchance, misjudge the distance
between A and B.

On this point Professor Van Til offers an interesting analogy. He cites the fact that Solomon, in building the temple, employed pagan Phoenicians as
laborers to cut the timbers, realizing that in this
task they were far more skillful than the covenant
people. Solomon did not, however, allow the Phoenicians to supply the blueprint, for this was from
God. The application of this analogy is:
Something similar to this should be our attitude toward
science. We gladly recognize the detail work of many
scientists as being highly valuable. We gladly recognize
the fact that "science" has brought to light many details.
But we cannot use modern scientists and their method as
the architects of our structure of Christian interpretation.
• • • • We offer the God and Christ of the Bible as the
concrete universal in relation to which all facts have
meaning. 16>

This would seem to confirm my thesis. It is hard to
see how the "details" furnished by non-Christians
would be themselves altered in a Christian system
of interpretation, unless one denies the "value" of
these details. In terms of the analogy, the Israelites
did not have to re-cut the timbers fashioned by the
Phoenicians in order to fit them into the temple.
Why, then, is Professor Van Til so concerned with
denying Kuyper's belief in common knowledge';
The answer is, I think, contained in his statements
that "the mind of man is a unit," and that "in the
interpretative endeavor the 'objective situation' can
13>

I. S. T., page 26.

14>
15>

Ibid., page 95.
Ibid., page 26.
Evidence, page 67.

16>
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never be abstracted from the 'subjective situ4
tion.'" 11 That is to say, as part of a system 4
thought (which is, as a whole, either for or again~t
God) no proposition can be neutral. So far forth, no
Calvinist would deny this. As the property of some
mind, every proposition which claims to represent
some fact acquires part of its meaning from the
religious presuppositions of that mind.
IV
To understand fully and accurately what one is
saying, he must know the context of that statement.
He must know how that person defines his terms and
this cannot be done unless he comprehends something of that person's basic philosophy. In this
sense all beliefs are part of a person's system of
thought, and they are essentially related to other
parts of that· system in a greater or lesser degree.
This truth has been exploited by those who affirm
the doctrine of "internal relations.'' They state, in
the words of Professor Brand Blanshard of Yale
(who argues in its favor): "1) That every term, i.e.
every possible object of thought, is what it is in
virtue of relations to what is other than itself; 2)
That its nature is affected thus not by some of its
relations only, but in differing degrees to all of
them, no matter how external they may seem; 3)
That in consequence of (2) and of the further obvious fact that everything is related in some way to
everything else, no knowledge will reveal completely the nature of any term until it has exhausted that
term's relations to everything else." 18 In other
words, every "fact" derives some of its essential
meaning from every other fact. The logical conclusion of this doctrine, as Blanshard point out, is
that " ... the ultimate object of thought ... is an
all-inclusive system in which everything is related
internally to everything else.'' 19 There is finally.
only one Fact, and this is necessarily the whole universe.
From the doctrine of internal relations, states
Blanshard, follows monistic idealism. Since this,
obviously, is not the desired goal of any Christian
philosopher, it is important to discover the fallacy
which has vitiated the argument. Nor is this difficult. It may be granted that within a system of
beliefs there does exist a kind of relation between
individual propositions which may be called ''internal," such that "all knowledge is inter-related.''
What the idealist does is to transfer the propertie~
of a system of thought to reality itself. The mind o1
man is a unit; therefore the universe is one. Proposi·
tions or beliefs are "ideas"; therefore the universE
is Ideal. Propositions are internally related; there·
fore facts are internally related.
17>
.--18 >

Common Grace, page 43.
The Nature of Thought, (Allen and Unwin, 1939), Vol

II, page 452.
10> Ibid., page 453.
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Two further conclusions should be spelled out in no way implies the possibility of a natural theo- /
clearly. The first is that coherence becomes the only logy. Unless there be revelation, man can know {
available criterion of truth, since there is no ex- nothing about God. But there is revelation. Gen-\
istential or factual order of Being which will serve eral revelation, as Calvin says, is objectively perto check the truth of any individual proposition. spicuous and sufficient to convince any right-minded \
The second is metaphysical: idealism must neces- man that God, the Creator and Ruler of the universe, \
sarily deny the traditional distinction between sub- exists. The beauty of the flowers in the field, for \
stance and accident with respect to individual example, would be impossible if God did not exist.
i
things. There is only one substance, the universe
For the Christian this is obviously true. Suppose,
as a whole. Anything less, such as a tree or a man,
now, that he attempts to convince his unbelievng /
is an accident of the universe.
friend that it is true. He must presuppose that the J
i
Such are the consequences of affirming the in- latter knows that the flowers are there, and that they I
ternal relatedness of propositions in a system of be- are beautiful. This is common ground. He may /
liefs, and failing to make a clear distinction between then seek to prove that ~her~ must be son:e principle J
these beliefs and the facts which they purport to of Absolute Beauty which is necessary m order to i
reveal. But if, on the contrary, there is a real order explain this example of Beauty. To this his friend/
of intelligible facts-in-relation which is what it is may or may not assent (Plato, e.g., would). Sup-/
in spite of our knowing or not knowing it, then it pose he does, however. Then this second principld
makes sense to talk about abstracting propositions becomes common ground. Thus the discussion ma~
from . the intellectual systems of which they are proceed to a divine Being, then to the God of Chris-'
parts. Thus the judgment of an unbeliever concern- tianity.
ing the distance between our two hypothetical
Two things may be observed about this discussion.
flowers can be considered by itself, and evaluated
A) The Christian, at every point, appeals to revealed
by inspecting the fact involved. It is possible befacts as his evidence. B) Unless the saving Grace
cause its truth and meaning is not derived from an
of God intervenes in the mind of the unbeliever, he
intellectual system but from reality.
will not be genuinely convinced of the final conThe Christian, then, would have no hesitation clusion.
about affirming "common ground." Reality itself is
Professor Van Til has a slightly different apthat common ground. The Christian knows that
proach. He says that " ... the only conclusive areven the unbeliever, whenever he makes a progument for Christianity is precisely the fact that
nouncement, is talking about that reality. If this
only upon the presupposition of the truth of its
were not so, the unbeliever could not say anything
teaching does logic or predication in general touch
at all, not even something false. When the unbe20
It is true that this is a good arguliever says something which is not completely false, reality at all."
ment,
but
it
is
not
evident that it is the only, or even
the Christian would not discount it completely, but
glorify God for His grace in revealing a partial truth the best, argument. If it is appropriate to claim the
to that unbeliever. He would consider it sinfully truth of Christianity by pointing to the fact of meanarrogant to affirm, e.g., that Socrates' statement to ingful predication, is it not even more appropriate to
the effect that it is better to suffer injustice than to claim that it is true by arguing the necessity of a
commit injustice is totally false, just because it is Creator to explain the fact of contingent being?
found in Plato's dialogues.
2) Professor Van Til makes much of the point
If this second epistemological view is Professor that the Christian must not appeal to "brute facts"
Van Til's basis for legitimate, "as if" cooperation
with non-Christian thinkers, then there is no argu- in apology for his faith. This is entirely true. It
ment. I would insist, however, that we do not with- does not, however, imply that we cannot appeal to
hold the attribution of truth to some of their utter- facts or to reality in apology for the faith. Indeed,
ances. Nor should we fail to appreciate the fact that to what else can one appeal?
Christians can learn much from non-Christian
Perhaps the difficulty here stems from a failure
writers, and that such learning need not prejudice
to
distinguish between the unbeliever's knowledge
our Christian view of the world. Wherever truth
is found, that is Christian truth; we~ ignore it of facts and the theories which he advances to exwith impunity.
plain that knowledge. The latter, no doubt, can be
shown to be inadequate in their bowing to "brute"
v
facts. Fortunately, however, what men do is often.
I shall conclude with some comments on apolobetter than what they say they do. We must capi-\
etics:
1) The view which I have sketched, an avowed talize on this inconsistency.
efense of Kuyper'i:; conception of common ground,
20> I. S. T., page 40.
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Our Dearth in Leadership
Annette Bouma Morris
Allendale, New Jersei

"As for my people, children are their oppressors, and women rule over them. 0 my people, they which lead thee cause
thee to err and destroy the way of thy paths."

HEN we celebrated the seventy-fifth anniversary of ~alvin College and ~ei:ninary,
it was mentioned that the trammg for
leadership was a specific objective in the
establishment of this institution. After three quarters of a century, may we not validly look for a history of a quantity of leaders in various fields of Reformed thinking and action?

W

Unless we beget men who will seize the power oft:
vital Christianity and use it to drive the machinei
of human thinking and action, we are doomed tc
spiritual extermination.

Nor have we a right to be satisfied with merE
survival; a philosophy perishes unless it be trans·
formed into vigorous and intelligent action. Wh)
has the Christian ethic as modernized by J ohr.
Calvin, and applied by many European Calvinists
not erupted into a stout American tree. Why havE
we no representatives in Congress, or among thE
nation's judiciaries, or in the United Nations' As·
I
sembly? Why are we not announcing great scienti·
A leader is one who sees the mountain peak and fie discoveries, introducing improved educationa:
challenges us to follow him to the summit. He is the practices, fighting for social justice, writing out·
man who fights his way to the fore and guides the standing books and dramas, producing our owr.
mob to his goal. Acutely conscious of some evil, he modern music, paintings, architecture and bein&
asks, "How has it been attacked traditionally? And great parents and consistory members, and teachers
how can I develop some better weapon?" Such men and ministers, and carpenters, and milk-dealers, anc
were needed; the impelling philosophy was there; machinists.
also the raw material. But the search is vain. We
No one of us can dismiss himself as being beyonc
have had men who could hold the helm; we have not
the
problem of leadership. A man must guide hh
produced captains to set the course.
own offspring, concerning whom he has promisec
There are those who can apply Abraham Kuyper "to instruct in the doctrine of the church." TherE
to the social scene, but who are not Abraham Kuy- must be a neighbor curious about religion. All oJ
per's. We become lyrical about T. S. Eliot, but we us, in our vocations, can be either the leader or thE
have borne no T. S. Eliot. John Dewey influences led. In public life, in church conduct, in our dailj
our pedagogy; but no John Dewey has pioneered work, at home so many leaders are needed that on~
our philosophy of education. American Calvinism cannot excuse himself as non-essential. At the samE
has begotten no Einstein, no Gandhi, no Michaelan·- time, we are not only in authority; we commonl)
gelo. We graft our Reformed opinion to the pagan choose our authorities. In church affairs, the com
tree. We grow no new tree.
munity, clubs, government, at work, our opinion i:
In a physical land where individual initiative is given in the choice of a head. How capable are we
the prime virtue; and in a spiritual country where the mob, the laymen, the common folk to decide wh<
man exists to glorify God, why have we produced will guide us? What are our standards?
no leaders of this quality? Why must we accept
II
mediocrity and a faltering voice when we seek
Before we can arrive at a remedy for our de
seminary and college professors, school teachers and
plorable
anemia, we must examine the causes. Per
trustees, consistory members and society officers?
haps
the
most damaging is our indifference to ou:
Why has the man in the pew, on the assembly line,
default
and
negligence. The first requirement fo
with his children, over the fence to a neighbor, at
salvation,
according
to our creed, is an awarenes:
the ballot-box-why has he no conception of the
our
sin
and
misery.
This may be applied to all o
of
implications of Calvinism and social action, and art,
our
problems.
And
to
this one. We are not awari
and law, and labor, and science, and family conduct,
of
the
need
for
good
leadership
nor of our remiss
and education?
ness to provide it. Our actions and attitudes indicat~
Yet leaders are essential to survival, that is, sur- that we believe the time for great deeds, heroi1
vival of us as a peculiar people with a unique philo- pioneering, progressive thinking to have passed
sop4y of living. Even animals dependent upon God, and His human agents, were giants when th1
social life for individual welfare choose some head, world was young. Today there is no need for great
and the pack prospers according to his cunning. ness.
18
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What absurdity is this! For in the same breath
we deplore the absence of a religious philosophy to
govern the use of the atom bomb, control international disputes, scientific achievements, education,
functioning of government, art production, recreation. God has not changed in His omnipotence; the
world's degeneracy continues. Hence, our only conclusion as to our participation is that we have grown
numb to the terrible need and lazy toward our
obligation. We shrink from the courage and sacrifice required to produce giants again.
Then, too, our standards for judging and obtaining
our leadership are warped and mistaken. An honest
evaluation of the reasons for selecting certain men
for the elder's office, the board of trustees, society
president, the township committee would disclose
that most men are admired because of their material
prosperity. Because sound financing is requisite to
the administration of a school, a church, a recreation
field, and because monetary bankruptcy is more
readily apparent than is spiritual poverty, we vote
the popular or wealthier men among us into office.
The successful lawyer becomes Sunday school superintendent, the D. Sc. is chosen as chairman of
the building committee, and the pastor is popular
as religious instructor of the women's society-all
this indicative of the fallacious reasoning that training in one field equips a man for authority in other
fields. We hold that a teacher who has a knowledge
of his subject matter comes automatically by the
knowledge of psychology necessary for effective
teaching, textbook writing, and lecturing. A minister tested as to his theology is presumed to be
equipped miraculously with a mastery of pedagogy;
and can therefore teach catechism, society meetings,
Bible Institute, college. Who is a great minister, an
able writer, a worthy teacher, an admirable councilman, an outstanding scientist? The clergyman who
turns out "a deep sermon"? The author who produces a "best-seller"? The pedagogue with steely
discipline? A civic manager who gets taxes reduced
and opens meeting with prayer? Or the scientist
who "sees God in everything"? What are our standards?
We are also lacking in a well-devised policy for
preparing and training leaders. We suppress our
children. In our fear of self-expression we have
passed to extreme repression. Self-government and
self- discipline are not encouraged amony our youth.
Young people of confessing and marriageable age
are told what hour to come in at night and to hand
over dumbly all or part of their income. Assess the
curricula of our schools, investigate home-instruction. Where can a young person acquire the principles and practice in home-making, or religious,
vocational, and civic authority? Who is there to
stimulate him to the discipline of independent,
vigorous, Godly thinking so indispensable to the
THE CALVIN FORUM

people who will make Calvinism vitalize the arts,
science, business, housekeeping, the manual trades?
They are not pioneers. They cannot face moral
conflict, make moral decisions. They do not wish .
to starve in a garret, sacrifice material comforts, endure scoffings, sweat tears and blood. Idealism is
rejected-replaced by a safe something called
"sanctified common sense." Parents do not wilfully
and deliberately encourage 'their offspring into that
lonely, painful toil of cutting a path through selflove and self-indulgence to reach the greater glorification of God by greater service to fellow-man.
They are trained in materialism, not Calvinism. Our
college students know the facts of science, theology,
pedagogy, law, some arts; graduates are respected
among secular universities. But one fails to evoke
answers to "How can I glorify God in the laboratory?
At my kitchen stove? In the union hall? While
painting a picture?" Yet we are engaged in such
activities; we have been training our students for
leadership for seventy-five years.
Nor are we encouraged to train ourselves for positions of authority. We consider ourselves as qualified as the next man to be deacon, trustee, father,
teacher. We believe that being a fairly decent
Christian satisfies the demands of any office. Or,
that regeneration has automatically equipped us
with unerring judgment and reliable opinion. Or
that years of experience in a position inevitably results in greater competence. There are few cases
on record where a man refused the elder's office, the
editor's chair, the presidency, because of a genuine
feeling of inadequacy. Once into the saddle, we
gallop along on observance of other riders, instinct,
and a hit-or-miss philosophy which maintains our
position only because others are even more inept or
ignorant. After twenty years in a particular assignment we are not only no more capable than we
were at first; we have calcified to the extent that we
can no longer improve. In addition to neglecting the
training of our youth and of ourselves, we abuse
those who do lead. We assume authority, and freely
criticise those elected to leadership, offering counter-opinions from our own wealth of ignorance and
unregenerate tastes. Ask a fellow-'Christian: "What
of Synodical decisions on amusements? Communism? Modern art? Methods of education? Good
literature?" He knows. Unlearned, we teach. Unguided, we lead. And when a man has been chosen
for a certain position, he is selected for several other
posts in the kingdom. As he accepts the superintendency of the Sunday school, he is serving at the
same time in the consistory, the school board, several committees, the town council. He is Personnel
Director at his office, father of several children, husband of one wife. Although 'it is apparent that he
cannot possibly discharge adequately the duties of
these offices and that other men are suffering from
want of stimulation to spiritual action and expres-
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sion for their. devotion, we continue to load one man
with all the work, and hold the rest unqualified and
unqualifiable.
Leaders are rarely appreciated in their time. It
may be said with complete safety that their value
can be measured inversely to 'their popularity.
Christ's Jews, Socrates' Greeks, Galileo's Italians,
Boniface's Frisians are among us today to crucify,
and lynch, and stone, or, more reprehensibly, to
sneer, to slander, to ignore. Will a man be Christ:
to forsake heaven for the kind of hell we award our
saviors? We repeat glibly the necessity of knowing
our sin and misery. But Woe! to the man who would
draw us from our slough.

III
To institute a proper and vigorous remedial pro-gram will be vital but laborious. Old standards
must be X-rayed, broken, and reset in honesty. Educational methods will need alteration. Our personal
philosophies want a probing reappraisal. Training
for authority begins in the cradle, applies to the two
sexes, to poor and to rich, to the brilliant and to the
dolt. All those who deal with youth must teach in
this awareness of the inescapability of leadership-both general (parent, evangelist, community leader)
and particular (his professional field). At home, in
the church, at school children must be challenged
with discussions, guided toward right conclusions.
The, requirement will not be satisfied by "saying a
piece" for Sunday school, nor by including a sub·ject called "Leadership" in the curriculum. It is to
be gained, rather, by a sympathetic ear for his small
opinions, an effort to enlarge his experience, an exchange of dictatorship for supervised self-decision.
"Must I take Latin?" would be replaced by, "Why
am I going to college? What course can best educate me?" "No, you may not go to the movies!"
arouses antagonism and rebellion. Why not discuss with him the purpose of recreation, the various
forms, and come to a conelusion on what a Christian
attitude would be. The atmosphere should be
charged con~inually with wholesome criticism, of
self, of others, of things-recognizing virtues as well
as faults, never breaking down without considering
reconstruction, always respecting the superior position of the authority in the field, forever seeking
knowledge upon which to base new theories of
Christian living.
Our habit of encouraging the audacious into further audacity, to the persistent repression of the
modest and the timid, has aborted countless embryonic leaders. John Smith, president of the class,
member of the debating team, editor of the college
yearbook, star of the play, representative at the intercollegiate oratorical contest-indicates the kind
of specialization we have accomplished in our educational process, this monop'oly inevitably resulting
in the snuffing out of the self-expression of the more
feeble members. What has a Christian institution
20

to do with competitive sports or scholasticism? Are
we merely to best the next man, our brother; or is it
God's will that each one develop fully those talents
with which he is endowed.
In the business and military worlds, each man's
qualifications are studied. He is sent to a specialized
school; he receives on-the-job training. In high
school, and certainly, in college, sound guidance
bureaus should be set up whereby a youth is advised
not only for what profession he is best suited, but
also, where is his Excalibur-what field of leadership lies fallow in God's kingdom for his plow.
A school lesson, a sermon, a lecture, by any agent,
for children or adults, should be an unceasing discussion of the character of some evil (such as the lack
of Christian influence in the labor union, poor
architecture in our church buildings, shortage of
teachers and missionaries), the remedies applicable,
and incentive to action.

IV
Two results will follow. Our graduates will enter
formal adulthood looking not for the methods of making the most money in the easiest way but rather
straining for spiritual worlds to conquer. And the
effect upon parents and teachers will be, "Lord, keep
me still unsatisfied." We never reach the elevation
at which we can sit smugly down to rest, having attained one goal. Have you been elected to the school
board? How can you select and dismiss teachers, appropriate moneys, approve and disapprove method~
of teaching, supervision, discipline unless you are
trained in these matters? There are books on pedagogy for the laymen at the library. There are
courses of study at night schools in almost any sub·
ject. Don't fear that your elementary school back
ground will be despised at the university neares1
you. There are experienced and sympathetic con
sultants to advise you. Have you been chosen t<
serve as elder? What do you know of our creed:
and doctrines, of the Acts of Synod, of our churcl
history. And what are you going to do about bein~
a real ruler of the church, knowing about the spirit
ual state of your congregation, and how it is min
istered to by your pastor?
A lifetime is scarcely enough to achieve proficienc;
in one work. How dare we sit back in sloth whe1
we have just begun the labor of equipping ourselve
and of finding our proper task? Then, having ac
complished this anticipation of a specific duty fo
each Christian, and intensive training for it, let u
reward our leaders and increase their efficiency b:
continued prayers for them as leaders and for us a
led. Their word will be received with respect, be
cause theirs are the voices of the learned, the voice
of the dedicated ones, the servants of God servin
all men-in the church, in the home, in busines:
Another seventy-five years, and. we will, by God'
grace, have heard the world utter its thanks for Hi
great boon-Calvinism.
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Front Our Correspondents
FROM THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA
The Editor
The Calvin Forum
Grand Rapids, Michigan

The University,
Potchefstroom, South Africa
May 8, 1953

Dear Dr. De Boer:
In this letter for publication in the Calvin Forum
I should like to tell you something about the election
just held in South Africa for our Parliament. As
you may know, our government is in the hands of a
Governor-General (a vice-regal office), the Parliament, and the Senate. Our Parliament is normally
reelected every five years. In 1948 we had a general
election when the present government (in the hands
of the National Party) came into power. In South
Africa we have really only two political parties that
count: the National Party under Dr. D. F. Malan
'and the United Party under Mr. J. G. H. Strauss
(su(!cessor to he well-known Gen. J. C. Smuts).
The third party is the so-called Labour Party.
The present election was fought between the National Party on the one side and the United Front
on .the other. The United Front was a pact between
the. United Party, the Labour Party, the Torch Commando, and two or more small sections. On the diss9l1,i.tion of Parliament the number of members was
M.>follows: National Party, 86; United Party, 64;
Lll,b9ur Party, 6; Native representatives, 3. The Nati():rlal Party had a clear majority of 13 over all other
sections. The result of the new election was this:
1'-T:i:!tionalParty, 94; United Party, 57; Labour Party,
5., The Native representation remained 3. The Natiopal Party has therefore increased its clear major-ityto 20. This leave no doubt. The electorate has
given Dr. Malan a decided majority, and he can pro·ceed to put his policy into action.
One of the most significant facts arising in this
election is that .the National Party has made a clean
sy/eep in the rural districts. Beside this, it has
gained urban seats. The power of the United Front
lies in the cities among the non-Afrikaans-speaking
sections of our population. That of the National
Party is in the country districts and several cities
among the Afrikaans-speaking population. The fight
was decided between the English-speaking and the
Afrikaans-speaking sect~ons. The ·National Party
had the support mainly of the Afrikaans-speaking,
a:J,1.d the United Front of th~ Englis}:J.-speaking sec't!ons .. Very few English-speaking people voted for
the National Party, while some ·177,000 Afrikaans§peaking people voted for the United Front. In
round figures the National Party obtained a total
vote of 640,000 and the United.Front 763,000. Prac~;fiE CALyIN FORUM
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tically all of the Coloured population voted in the
United Front. Thus the opposition has the majority
of the voters on its side, but the National Party has
a majority of 29 members in the Parliament. There
is nothing strange about this. The Conservative
government of Sir Winston Churchill in England
has a majority of 17 seats while the Labour Party
assembled 231,000 more votes. And the total number of votes cast against Churchill amounted to over
1,100,000.
On the question why the National Party won, the
answer would depend on the standpoint of the writer. A supporter says, inter alia: the National Party
has a policy that is clear and the embodiment of the
deepest convictions of 60% of the South African
population. It has a strong leader; it is a pure party;
having no sections. On the other hand, the United
Front has no clearcut policy; it has the support of the
most divergent groups (English, Jews, Coloureds,
Conservatives, Liberals, Labourites, Dominionists,
Empire lovers, etc.); and it has a weak leader since
the passing of Gen. Smuts. There is no doubt that
the National Party has the support of the South
African youth. I do not desire to pose as a prophet,
but I cannot see how the opposition will be able to
overthrow the present government in the near
future. My argument for this statement is twofold:
The National Party has a policy supported by the
vast majority of the Afrikaans-speaking voters and
supported by the overwhelming majority of the new
voters. (Youth is on the side of the National Party).
In other words, the National Party has a clear set
of principles and the support of an ever-increasing
number of voters.
A very brief comparison of the under lying policies
of the National party and of the United Front might
make this clear. The National Party stands for the
maintenance of the absolute sovereignty and independence of the South African state, while the United
Front believes that full membership of the British
Commonwealth of Nations confers unique advantages
on South Africa. The National Party believes
national unity between the European language
groups in South Africa, but maintains that this unity
can be achieved only by absolute equality between
these two groups, by mutual respect and by individual loyalty to South Africa as the only fatherland. The'United Party stands for the broad national unity of all South Africans irrespective of
any racial differences, particularly colour differences.
The National Party stands for the maintenance of
European government in South Africa; it wants to
achieve this by applying a policy of apartness in the
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social, territorial, economic, and political spheres;
and it rejects all attempts at equalization in these
spheres between white and non-white. The United
Party does not believe that total separation now or
in the future is desirable or practical, and yet, it believes in and practice partial separation, particularly
social and economic. The National Party believes
in active rejection and suppression of Communism
while the United Party stands for a rather indecisive
action against people who believe in Communism.
The National Party stands for the full sovereignty
of the Union Parliament. It claims that the highest
legislative body in South Africa should be the
elected Parliament and that the courts should interpret and apply the laws made by Parliament and
should have no right to declare a law of Parliament

as ultra vires. Where necessary the National Party
believes in the lawful changing of the Constitution
of the Union. The Unite,d Party, however, believe$
that the Constitution was a compact entered into a1
the time of the Union and that nothing has happened
since to weaken its sanctity and pledges itself to de·
fend the Constitution.
In conclusion I may state that the new govern·
ment will proceed legally to put into effect its policy
of apartness, its policy of the sovereignty of Parlia:
ment, its policy of putting Coloured voters on D
separate roll. Meanwhile no European need fem
any abolition of his rights as a citizen.
With kind regards,
J. CHR. CoETZEE

Book Reviews
ADVENTURING FOR GOD
M. ZwEMrm.
By J. Christy Wilson. Grand Rapids: Baker Booh
H oitse. 261 pages. $4.00.

APOSTLE TO ISLAM: A BIOGRAPHY OF SAMUEL

,..., C'7\11'0DERNITY with its emphasis on gadgets and

(V Ol machines has begotten a drab culture. The .lives

of most people are characterized by deadening
apathy to what is going on in the world. Those who constitute exceptions to the run-of-the-mill mass spend their
years on the thin edge of a nervous frenzy which is artificially induced and leads precisely nowhere. It can't be denied
that this dull routine has rotted the fabric of Christian conviction and experience within the churches of our land.
The high adventure of doing great things for God on the
grounds of expecting great things from God has too frequently been choked by our craving for creaturely comforts. Much of our American Christianity is pseudosophisticate, a paltry imitation of the garish world and therefore devoid of apostolic fervor and power.
This fascinating story of the pioneer of American missions to the Moslem world is a refreshing reminder of the
heroism of living for Christ. It has been rightly called "a
definitive biography of the giant among missionaries in this
century." As such this review of the life and labors of Dr.
Zwemer serves to recall us to our prime duty of witnessing
for Christ in a hostile world and reminds us that a comfortable Christianity often signifies spiritual suicide for the
church.
The author tells his story well. He is thoroughly equipped for his task, since he also labored for several years
among the Moslems, knew the subject of his biography intimately, and succeeded him as teacher of Christian missions
at Princeton. The reading of the titles of the four sections
of the book already whets our appetite: As the Twig is Bent,
To the Heart of the Moslem World, In Journeyings Often,
:md The Harvest of the Years. It is the gripping tale of
the trials and triumphs of laboring for the Lord in the most
difficult and dangerous sector of the non-Christian world.
Many quotations from diaries, letters, and books serve admirably to introduce us to the mind and heart of the mis22

sionary whose story this is. Particularly impressive is thi
wide range and thorough grasp of Dr. Zwemer's knowledg€
of the Moslems who so qften have been alternately ignore<
and feared by the Christian churches. His compelling con
viction that only Jesus Christ is the answer to the need oi
the Moslem world was succinctly stated by himself mor(
than forty years ago. At one of the many conference:
which featured him as the leading speaker he told hii
audience:
As our eyes sweep the horizon of all these land;
dominated or imperilled by this great rival faith, eacl
seems to stand out as typical of one of the factors int.h.1
great problem. Morocco is typical of the degradatioJ
of Islam; Persia of its disintegration; Arabia of it
stagnation; Egypt of its attempted reformation; Chin:
shows the neglect of Islam; Java the conversion .P'
Islam; India the opportunity to reach Islam; Equitoria
Africa its peril. Each of these typical conditions. is i1
itself an appeal. The supreme need of the Mosler]
world is Jesus Christ. He alone can give light ti
Morocco, unity to Persia, life to Arabia, re-birth ti
Egypt, reach the neglected in China, win Malaysia, mee
the opportunity in India, and stop the aggressive peri
in Africa. (p.174).
.,
Such passionate love, keen insight, and intense zeal .£(1
preaching the gospel yielded a rich harvest on the field r
meeting the non-Christians and at home in stirring th
churches to a sense of their heavenly commission.
The book deserves careful attention. The life and labor
of its subject are carefully recorded. It is provided with
good index and lists the books which flowed with amazi!l
and increasing rapidity from his facile pen. An apology i
made for not mentioning the articles written by Zwemer o
the grounds that the list would be quite interminable. Th
reader is amazed that one man, even with the long years o
vigor allotted to him, could accomplish so much for th
cause of Christ.
'vVe believe that the value of the book would have bee
measurably increased, if more attention had been paid i
Zwemer's missionary strategy. Although the author O(
casionally refers to the message which burned upon h
heart and the methods which he prosecuted with a Iar&
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Diagnose ? No, he cannot do this and should refrain from
any such attempt. Recognize first symptoms, as in the case
of measles, etc? Yes, this is important. Dr. Hamer points
to serious consequences which ill-advised spiritual admonition may have for a person afflicted with a distortion in his
personality. The well-meaning pastor can do great harm
because he fails to understand.
What is this valuable book like? It sets forth recognizable symptoms and describes in general the course of the
most common form of deviations from normal mental life.
It also suggests in what direction therapy generally is undertaken and gives a brief appraisal of different kinds of
psycho-therapy. Then the author indicates what place spiritual counsel has in the various cases as they are identified.
PETER Y. DE JONG
When I was in the Netherlands three years ago, I heard
South India
one of the leading Reformed theologians deliver an address
at the opening of a seminary. He pointed out, among other
THE PASTOR AND PSYCHIATRY
things, that a minister of the gospel must first and foremost
be a theologian. He must be a student of the living Word
ZIELSZORG EN PsYCHIATRIE. By Dr. B. Christian Hamer.
Kampen, The Netherlands:!. H. Kok, 1952. 226 pages. of God in order to be able to lead God's people in the green
pastures of that Word. Very true this is, and no other ac8.50 guilders.
tivity may intrude upon this major task. But he, as a min~HIS is a book every pastor should read. Our Chrisister, must lead people in the feeding upon that vVord for
tian teachers, too, can profit greatly from Hamer's every area of life. This means that he must understand
discussion.
people. The Word must be made relevant to the particular
How shall we translate the title, especially the first word? situation in which a Christian finds himself. Dr. Hamer verv
What is the English equivalent for the Dutch word zielszorg'! aptly points out how the Word can speak to the huma~
The word is composed of two parts, ziel and zorg. The for·- heart even in moments of imbalance and distortion in his
mer means soul. The latter is best translated to take care personality.
of, provide for, or look after. But these do not convey the
I know of no book quite so pertinent for spiritual counfull meaning of zorg. Zorg has more personal communica- selors. The controversial issues in psychology and psytion in it. Spirit to spirit communication stands at the chiatry are not ignored, but honestly taken into account. A
center of it. A colleague of mine in the English department comparatively new area of general revelation is made reinforms me that originally the English word care meant levant to the work of the pastor in his delicate work with
about the same as the Dutch word zorg.
apparent personality deviations. We need more study in this
This book addresses itself to the problem of recogmzmg field. We need Christian psychiatrists, men of Goel, dominated
deviations in the normal mental life of the person who comes by the Spirit of Christ, who will open the field of underunder the pastoral care of a minister of the gospel. Hence, standing people to us. We thank God for the few men that
the advice to every pastor who can read the Dutch to study are now entering upon this important work.
this book with some care.
CORNELIUS J AARSMA
The author is a psychiatrist and a Christian of the ReCalvin College
formed faith. He knows psychiatry, but he also knows the
gospel. What is more, he knows the relative significance of
A COMMENTARY FOR EDIFICATION
each in the life of people. He is competent to advise pastors
EXPOSITION OF THE GosPEL OF JonN. By Arthur W. Pink.
on the important subject of understanding people.
Reprinted by Zondervan Publishing Co., Grand Rapids,
And how important it is to understand people. In our
Michigan, 1953.
time many people are seeking help from the psychiatrist. The
NYONE looking for a conservative evangelical commedical profession is beginning to realize how basic inner
mentary on the gospel of John, written from the
security of the soul-life is to the physical well-being of the
generally dispensational, pre-millenarian, Baptist
person. College classes in abnormal psychology and related
courses fill up rapidly on registration day. People want to point of view, will find it in this work by the. well-known
know more about themselves This is not an unhealthy or author of "The Sovereignty of God," "Exposition of
ilegitimate desire in itself. But back of it as a motivating Genesis" and a large number of polemical and doctrinal
factor may be some undesirable situations in the person's pamphlets and books-who served a number of pastorates
life which he himself is not conscious of or cannot admit to in America and resided in Scotland until his death in 1945.
himself.
This commentary was written in 1923 and the present
There are people in 1.he churches who avoid pastors and three-volume work is a complete reprint of the original fourconsistories in their problems because they, for some reason, volume set, with new clearer print and with the addition of
have the wrong attitude toward spiritual ministry in the Scripture references at the top of each page.
church. The soul-care idea is not present to them. They
It is not necessarily a criticism to say that the book bears
find their way into guidance bureaus, to marriage counselors, few of the marks of the usual "scholarly" type of commenand the like. But these are rarely capable of giving their tary. The author evidently wrote, as he says, "to edify those
counseling the emphasis of soul-care. How necessary then who are members of the Household of faith." He omics
that our pastors come to understand more of the deviations points that he considers of purely academic importance beto which their parishioners are su.bject particularly today. cause "they provide no food for the soul." His expressed
measure of success, too much of this is mentioned in a rather
incidental way. A careful analysis of this from his life and
works ought to be soon forthcoming, in order that the secret
of his strength may be more appreciated.
This book ought to find its way into the libraries of many
Christian homes and schools and churches throughout the
English-speaking world. It is a necessary antidote to
the lackadaisical spirit which today suffocates the spiritual
life of many who name the name of Christ. For whether
we witness for the Saviour of mankind at home or abroad,
the world needs men and women of unfaltering conviction
and unflagging zeal. Only when this is present will the
churches be able to respond to the high calling wherewith
they have been called by God.

-l.:J
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was"to obtain from.God.the meaning of the text, a1d
•. • • to apply its lessons . . , effectively to his hearers and
reagen;."
·
There are many things to admire about the author and
the work before us. The book is not dry and pedantic, but
is easy to read, deeply devotional, filled with personal testimony to the author's faith and earnestness. On the fundamentals of the Christian faith, Pink is soundly conservative. He is sometimd sharpy polemic, not hesitating to
describe a false position as "a Satanic falsehood." He accepts much of the Calvinistic emphasis (cf. p. 30 vol. 1) and
opposes ultra-dispensationalism, modern faith-healing cults,
and the like. Sometimes his doctrinal exposition is outstanding. His treatment of regeneration in connection with
John 3 is exceptionally illuminating.
There is especially one feature about the commentary to
which the present reviewer must take exception. The Rev.
Mt'. Pink is given to allegorical or, as he calls it, symbolic
interpretation. Especially does this come out in his treatment of Christ's miracles. Undoubtedly the miracles of
Jesus have spiritual significance. They are called "signs"
which leaves room for something more than merely that
they proved His Deity. But when the miracle of the wedding in Cana of Gaillee is made to mean that the stone waterpots are the natural heart of man, their being set apart is a
symbol of the Old Testament of law, the water is the Word,
and the wine is the <Divine joy of regeneration, we have a
case not of. exegesis but of "eisegesis." Those ide,as are not
hi the text, ready to be drawn. out. They are dutside the
tex.t and are put in. The author . treats simiarly of the
rhirgcle at the pool of Bethesda. On page 130, vol. I, amazing
and.xemote deductions are drawn from several apparently
incidental and utterly remote references to bra~s in the
On page 168 of the same volume ten references
wells 'are collected from passages in the Bible from.
• t.::rem!Sls to Proverbs to prove that wells are type of Christ.
These examples are sufficient to indicate the type of
treatment to which we refer. 'There is a temptation to fall
into this sort o(thing. Frequently the listeners in the pew
ljke it because it seems to them to be profound analysis of
J5cripture. However, if it is not there, it is not proper, we
feel, to import it, although extravagant typology and allegonot unknown even to otherwise very careful ex-

ARNoLD BRINK
Chicago, Ill.

SCHOLARLY EXEGESIS OF MATTHEW
AN. EXEGETICAL CoMMENTARY oN THE GosPEL AccoRDING
TO MATTHEW. By Alfred Plummer. Grand Rapids:
Wm. B. Berdmans, 1953, 451 pages, $5.00.
:

ORROWING an expression of Dr. Albertus Pieters
one may well call this commentary an "outstanding
·
example of that happy combination of profound
schoarship and evangelical Christian faith so often found in
the great scholars of the Church of England" (The Lamb, the
Woman and the Dragon, p. 361). It is designed, according
to the author's preface, as a supplement to the commentary
{;D.·

p

in the I.C.C .. series on Matthew by Rev. W. G. A:ilf~li: 'I~~
Rev. Allen restricted himsef to. literary questious; 'tlii.~
volume gives a more exegetical, historical, and theologic~l
approach.
As a reprint of the second edition the value of this work.i~
limited by the fact that it takes no account of recent developci
ments. But Dr. Plummer's command of the literature of hl~
day (i.e., about 1910) on this subject was complete, and her~
we have the product of great learning.
Anyone expecting to find ready-made material for ser1
mons here will be disappointed. The commentary is exegefi:
cal, but very seldom expository or "practical." There are
occasional remarks of that character that are very fine, as fo~
example the warning against publicity of church giving oi/
page 90. In general the purpose is to provide concise state!
ment as to the probable meaning of the text. Much attentior1
is given to parallels with Mark and Luke, and in lesser de:
gree, John. There are many references to apocryphal anc
patristic literature. In finer print problems of textual criti·
cism and language are mentioned from time to time.
The introductory essay on The Christology of the Firs1
Gospel takes a strong stand on the full deity of Christ, ~
theme which is defended throughout the book. Plummei
also does not hesitate to defend all the miracles, the existend
of angels and evil spirits, the Trinity, and other evang~licai
doctrines. His view of the atonement is very universalisti~
e.g., comments on 20 :28 on page 280. Whenever. opportun;
ity is presented, he argues against the idea of everlastin~
punishment, hinting rather at its disciplinary character. Hh
teaching on the relationship of the believer to the Savior)~
rather vague. Interesting is the fact that he doubts the atJ
thenticity of the "except for fornication" clause about <ii'
vorce, and maintains the absolute indissolubility of marriage
The apologetical value of the book against attacks on thl
deity of Christ and the historicity of his works. and wQ.fg.j
can be appreciated. However, it is vitiated a· large e:S:t~~
by a very compromising view of the origin of Scripture:; ~~~
leniency toward higher critical positions. The final a.i+tliO.J
of the gospel was not the apostle Matthew. Almost a,cil~i
proportionately large amount of space is devoted to co,11j~C)
tures as. to sources of specific passages and comparisons "';i~l
the other two Synoptics. Although Plummer's own concltl{
sions regarding the writings of the New Testament are ~Cl~
servative he seems to share rather extreme views of the 01<
Testament, questioning the historicity of. Jonah (p. 183); ~;
Noah, and of Lot's wife (p. 340). I could not find ..a w:orl
ascribing the Scriptures to the inspiration of the Holy<~~ifi
it.. He asserts that, whatever the reason, we must notr;e
gard Christ as authorative for matters of criticism, e~g., tlli
authorship of Psalm 110. From a Reformed viewpoiij
these are serious concessions to a rationalistic meth.od. Ii
spite of many excellent features one feels that the ~amell
nose is in the tent, and an apologetic based on this .positio1
cannot successfully maintain itself against enemies of tJ:1
truth. Therefore the book is not to be recommended fo
use by any but theologically trained students.
ELco H. OosTENDoRP
Lacombe, Alberta
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